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FROM MORAL AGENCY TO COLLECTIVE
WRONGS:
RE-THINKING COLLECTIVE MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Marion Smiley*
How is collective moral responsibility possible? This is the
major question now being asked about collective responsibility in
philosophical circles. But the question is rarely posed in such
general terms. Instead, it is posed as a question about the ability of
groups to intend and to act. How, philosophers ask, can groups be
understood to intend and to act in contexts where they are being
held morally responsible for harm? I argue below that this
question—and the assumptions that ground it—are misguided and
that if we really want to know whether collective moral
responsibility is possible we will have to shift our attention away
from the ability of groups to intend and to act and focus on their
ability to produce bad things and be blamed for them. In other
words, we will have to rethink collective moral responsibility
itself.
I begin in Part One by agreeing with critics that groups are not
able to act and to intend in the sense required by the prevailing
notion of moral responsibility. I suggest in Part Two that, contrary
to critics, collective moral responsibility is not defeated by the
inability of groups to intend and to act, since the ability to act and
to intend is not a condition of moral responsibility per se. Instead,
it is a condition of one particular—distinctly Kantian—notion of
moral responsibility. In Part Three, I sketch the contours of an
alternative notion of collective moral responsibility and suggest
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that it is both morally acceptable and appropriate to groups such as
corporations, clubs, and nation states.
I. COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE QUESTION OF
INTENTIONS
Collective moral responsibility is the moral responsibility of
collectives, rather than individuals, for harm. Hence, it has groups
themselves, rather than group members, as its moral agents, and
cannot—qua collective moral responsibility—be distributed to
group members in the guise of individual moral responsibility. Nor
can it be divided up among them. Instead, it has to remain attached
to the groups themselves—whether these groups are mobs, clubs,
corporations, or nations—and understood as the result of
something harmful that these groups have themselves done or
failed to do qua groups.1
Since collective moral responsibility has groups, rather than
group members, as its moral agents, it might be thought to be
different in kind from individual moral responsibility and to have a
structure, meaning, and set of requirements of its own. But, in the
works of contemporary philosophers who write about collective
moral responsibility, it does not. (I discuss several important
exceptions in Part Three.) Instead, it has the same meaning,
structure, and requirements as its individualistic counterpart.
1

I do not mean to suggest here that collective responsibility is totally
independent of the actions of group members. For, it is not. In some cases, we
ascribe collective responsibility to groups partly, although never wholly, on the
basis of what we understand to be the contributions of particular individuals. In
other cases, we use our ascriptions of collective responsibility as a starting point
for thinking about whether particular individuals are responsible for harm.
Moreover, we are often justified in doing so. But we cannot—even in cases such
as these where individual and collective responsibility come together—equate
the two or understand collective responsibility as a matter of mere shared
individual responsibility. Instead, we have to acknowledge that collective
responsibility is the responsibility of undifferentiated wholes. I explore the
relationship between individual and collective responsibility, as well as other
aspects of collective responsibility, in Marion Smiley, Collective Responsibility,
in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2010 ed.),
available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/collectiveresponsibility.
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Indeed, it is the same notion of moral responsibility. What is this
notion?
While those now writing about collective moral responsibility
rarely explore the notion of moral responsibility that they employ,
they do make clear that moral responsibility is from their
perspective not just a matter of causal responsibility. Instead, it is a
matter of both causal responsibility and moral blameworthiness
together. Likewise, they make clear that while moral responsibility
understood as such may ground social and legal responsibility, it is
not something that we ascribe to agents after they have acted on
the basis of our own criteria of blameworthiness. Instead, it is a
moral fact about agents: namely, that they caused something bad
and are morally blameworthy.2
How can we think about moral responsibility as a matter of
causal responsibility and blameworthiness together? How can we
think about it as a moral fact about agents themselves independent
of worldly practice? I address these questions much more fully
elsewhere.3 Suffice it to point out here that what enables us to
think about moral responsibility in this way is a particular,
distinctly Kantian, notion of blameworthiness that many of us
might not feel comfortable defending in general but that we
nevertheless frequently assume, often un-self-consciously, in our
discussions of moral responsibility.4
2

The conflation of causation and moral blameworthiness here is accepted
by almost all of those now writing about the moral responsibility of agents for
external harm. John Harris is typical when he writes of moral responsibility:
“[W]hen we say that someone was the cause of harm . . . (or at least as one of
the authors), we are saying that he is responsible for it and . . . to blame.” John
Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192, 207
(1974).
3
See generally MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A
PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW (1992) [hereinafter SMILEY, MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY].
4
The Kantian notion of moral responsibility is that which locates the
source of moral blameworthiness in an agent’s own will—or willful causation of
a bad act—and insists that such blameworthiness be understood as independent
of worldly practices of blame. Kant developed this notion of moral
responsibility primarily in, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(H. J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785), as well as in, RELIGION WITHIN
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Three things about this notion of blameworthiness are key in
this context and distinguish it from other notions of moral
blameworthiness. First, it is moral, rather than social or legal,
blameworthiness and moral blameworthiness of a particular kind:
namely, that associated with moral guilt and frequently referred to
in the language of moral taint.5 Second, it is not relative to worldly
considerations but rather a matter of deserving blame in some
abstract—and ideal—sense. Third, it is wholly under an
individual’s own control and has its source in moral agency itself,
or, in other words, in the act of freely willing either one’s own bad
action or harm in the world.
These three features make it possible for us to think about
moral responsibility as a moral fact about agents themselves rather
than as something that we ascribe to agents as part of our worldly
practices of blame. The first two enable us to imagine moral
responsibility as untainted by the various contingencies—social,
political, and practical—associated with practices of social and
legal blame. The third allows us to think about moral responsibility
as a matter of both causal responsibility and blameworthiness
together, as well as to ensure that blameworthiness does not
require further justification once moral agency for harm has been
established.
As it turns out, all three of these features are problematic. The
first feature, the independence of blameworthiness from particular
THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson, trans.,
Harper & Row 1960) (1793), where he famously wrote that “[I]nnate . . . guilt .
. . is so denominated because it may be discovered in man as early as the first
manifestation of the exercise of freedom . . . .” Id. at 33. I discuss the Kantian
notion of moral responsibility extensively in, SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 3, at 72–101, and refer to several contemporary versions of it in Part
II.
5
The most common way of expressing this notion of moral
blameworthiness is moral guilt of the kind associated with the value of an
individual qua moral agent. Jonathan Glover captures the prevailing notion of
moral blameworthiness when he writes of moral blameworthiness that it is a
moral fact about the worth of persons: a “kind of moral accounting, where a
person’s actions are recorded on an individual balance sheet, with the object of
assessing his moral worth.” To say that an individual is morally blameworthy
for some state of affairs is to say that “he is a bad person.” JONATHAN GLOVER,
RESPONSIBILITY 64, 96 (Routledge & K. Paul, 1970).
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practices of blame and actual blamers, is very difficult to
substantiate. For, while blameworthiness may not require that we
actually blame an agent, it does require for its very meaning that
we make reference to a particular practice of blame; and once we
make reference to a particular practice of blame, we have to
acknowledge that while we can—and should—take into
consideration what agents actually do to deserve blame, we cannot
treat their blameworthiness as completely under their own control.6
The other two features of moral blameworthiness are equally
difficult to sustain. The second—total control by moral agents over
themselves and their actions—requires a very strong notion of free
will that may simply not exist if theories of determinism are true.7
The third feature—the location of moral blameworthiness in the
act of freely willing a bad action or harm in the world—i.e., in
moral agency itself—becomes difficult to sustain once we
acknowledge that an undetermined will may not only not be
grounded in moral personality but be by nature a matter of
randomness. How, J. J. C. Smart asked many years ago, can the
absence of determinism be anything other than randomness?8
Not surprisingly, the difficulties associated with the prevailing
6

The dependence of blameworthiness on a particular practice of
blameworthiness is less obvious in religious contexts than it is in secular
contexts, since in religious contexts we are able to posit an ideal blamer, namely,
God, and to take for granted that his/her/its criteria of blameworthiness are in
some sense ideal and perhaps even objective. But even in religious contexts,
moral blameworthiness has to be understood as both part of a particular practice
of blame and dependent on an actual blamer to be meaningful. Theologians do
not have to worry about such dependence, since, unlike secular philosophers,
they do not view moral responsibility as wholly under an agent’s control.
7
The concern here is that if determinism is true, free will is not possible,
since freedom of the will—or at least that which grounds moral responsibility as
traditionally understood—requires that the agent in question have originated, not
only her actions, but the will behind them. To do so is not possible if that will is
determined for her by forces external to itself, whether these forces are
biological or social. The likelihood that determinism is true has led many
philosophers in the Western tradition to ask how free will might be rendered
compatible with determinism. Kant himself answered this question in
GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS by creating a realm of pure
rationality in which moral agents are able to transcend determinism.
8
See generally J. J. C. Smart, Free-Will, Praise, and Blame, 70 MIND 291
(1961).
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notion of moral responsibility are exacerbated in cases where what
an agent is being held morally responsible for are not just
his/her/its own actions but external harm itself. For, an agent’s
causal responsibility for external harm is relative to various social
norms, expectations, and projects that have their source in social
and political practice, rather than something he/she/it controls.9
Hence, it would not appear to be the kind of thing in virtue of
which an agent could be morally blameworthy.
Since the prevailing notion of moral blameworthiness is so
problematic, we might expect those who write about moral
responsibility to explore these problems in depth or at least to
acknowledge them. But they do not generally do so. Instead, they
do two things to make things easier for themselves in contexts
where they have to make explicit the conditions under which
agents are morally responsible in practice. The first is simply to
take the above notion of moral blameworthiness for granted as
coherent. The second is to replace “free will” with “intentionality”
in the articulation of these conditions.10
What conditions must be present if individuals are going to be
held morally responsible, not only for their own actions, but for
external harm as well? First of all, the agent must have performed
an action that was causally responsible for the harm—which, most
9

While most of those now writing about causal responsibility in the
context of moral agency acknowledge the importance of these social norms,
expectations, and projects to the causal responsibility of an agent’s action for
harm, they do not agree on how these social norms, expectations, and projects
are incorporated into our judgments of causal responsibility. For three very
different perspectives here see generally John Casey, Actions and Consequences,
in MORALITY AND MORAL REASONING: FIVE ESSAYS IN ETHICS, 155 (1971);
John Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192
(1974); Dennis Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The
Problem of Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905 (1980).
10
Not surprisingly, such a substitution is very helpful here, since
intentionality, unlike free will, can be discovered in the world, and since it is
already associated with practices of blame—social and legal—with which we
are familiar. But, as I argue in Volitional Excuses and the Primacy of Fairness
(forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), the substitution of
“free will” with “intentionality” is nevertheless questionable. For, the point of
insisting on free will in the context of moral blameworthiness is that it is
supposedly under an individual’s own control, and the process of formulating
intentions may well be part of a determined psychological process.
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of those now writing on the subject agree, is a matter of being a
“primary cause” of it. Second, the agent must have freely willed or
at least intended that action to the extent that we can say that
he/she/it was in control over it and hence is its exclusive source.
How difficult is it for moral agents to meet these two
conditions, i.e., act in a way that is causally responsible for harm
and do so intentionally? In cases where the moral agents in
question are individual human beings, rather than groups, we may
disagree with each other about what criteria to use in discerning
causal responsibility and intentionality. But we do not find either
condition very difficult to meet. Nor should we. For, human beings
can act in ways that are causally responsible for harm. Likewise,
they can, if they have achieved a certain level of selfconsciousness, have intentions.
Things become much more troublesome in cases where the
moral agents in question are collective entities, though. This is
because the two things that ostensibly render an agent morally
responsible for harm in the above sense—performing an action that
we can consider causally responsible for harm and intending this
action—require consciousness. While collective entities, whether
they are corporations, clubs, or nation states, may be capable of
formulating policies and causing harm, they do not appear to be
capable of consciousness or, for that matter, of having minds.
How, then, can they be understood to act or to intend at all?
Critics of collective moral responsibility answer this question
in the negative and contend that groups cannot perform actions that
are causally responsible for harm or have intentions. H. D. Lewis
and J. W. W. Watkins argued early on that actions are associated
exclusively with individuals, not groups, and that groups, which do
not have minds of their own, cannot make choices or hold beliefs
in the sense required by the formulation of intentions.11
Contemporary skeptics, including Alvin Goldman, Stephen
Sverdlick, J. Angelo Corlett, and Jan Narveson, are generally less
strident than their predecessors. But, they too, have insisted that
collective moral responsibility falls short once we acknowledge the
11

See generally H. D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, 23 PHIL. 3 (1948);
J.W.W. Watkins, Methodological Individualism and Social Tendencies, 8 BRIT.
J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 104 (1957).
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simple fact that collective entities cannot have genuine mental
lives.12
While skeptics have concentrated primarily on the inability of
groups to act and to have intentions, they have also on occasion
focused on the notion of moral blameworthiness and drawn
attention to what they refer to as the inappropriateness of
associating moral blameworthiness with groups. R. S. Downie’s
concerns here are typical. R.S. Downie argues that while we might
be able to sustain notions of group agency, we cannot sustain
notions of collective moral responsibility, since the latter requires
that the agent in question be morally blameworthy.13 Jan Narveson
goes as far in this context to argue that the bearers of moral
blameworthiness have to be individuals because only individuals
can have moral agency. “Nothing else can literally be the bearer of
full responsibility.”14
How do advocates of collective moral responsibility respond
here? Interestingly enough, they do not reject the claim that groups
have to be able to act and to intend in order to be morally
responsible for harm. Instead, they accept this claim and set out to
show that, contrary to critics, groups are capable of acting and
intending. Unfortunately, as I suggest below, none of their efforts
to show that groups can act and have intentions have been wholly
successful. Indeed, they all appear to have serious drawbacks of
the kind that should make the rest of us pause before we try to talk
about group intentions and group actions ourselves.
12

See, e.g., Angelo Corlett, Collective Moral Responsibility, 32 J. SOC.
PHIL. 573 (2001); ALVIN GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION (Prentice
Hall 1970); Jan Narveson, Collective Responsibility, 6 J. ETHICS 179 (2002);
Stephen Sverdlik, Collective Responsibility, 51 PHIL. STUD. 61 (1987).
13
See generally R. S. Downie, Collective Responsibility, 44 PHIL. 66
(1969). Larry May and Stacey Hoffman capture Downie’s central claims here
very nicely when they write: According to Downie, “Collectives do not have
moral faults, since they don’t make choices, and hence they cannot properly be
ascribed moral responsibility . . . . For there to be moral responsibility there
must be blameworthiness involving a morally faulty decision, and this can only
take place on the individual level.” Larry May & Stacey Hoffman, Introduction,
in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL
AND APPLIED ETHICS 1–14 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds. 1991).
14
See generally Jan Narveson, Collective Responsibility, 6 J. ETHICS 179
(2002).
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One of the most common strategies employed here is simply to
point out that we do in fact blame collectives in practice in ways
that appear to make sense to us. David Cooper relies on this
strategy heavily in his own defense of collective responsibility.
According to Cooper, there is an obvious point to be recognized
and that “obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to
collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are
held towards collectives as well as towards individuals.”15
Deborah Tollefsen picks up on the importance of blaming
attitudes here in her own defense of collective moral responsibility
as a way of grounding the existence of both group actions and
group intentions.16 According to Tollefsen, the sheer fact that we
have emotional responses to groups such as anger, resentment, and
moral indignation means that collective moral responsibility is
both possible and meaningful.17 Likewise, the sheer fact that we
have feelings of pride, guilt, and shame as group members, tells us
that the group moral agency required by collective moral
responsibility exists.18
Cooper and Tollefsen may have accurately described both the
blaming attitudes and the emotional reactions that we have to
groups that do bad things in practice. But their analyses share two
basic limitations. First of all, the sheer fact that we have attitudes
and reactions that signal our belief in collective moral agency or
that require us to have such a belief does not mean that collective
moral agency actually exists. Nor does it mean that we are justified
in having the attitudes and reactions to groups that we do. (We
could simply be wrong and/or be falling back on very useful
myths.) Instead, it means only that we—or at least some of us—
have these attitudes and reactions and that we do not as a
community find them strange.
Second, while we may think that that we are blaming a group,
and refer to ourselves as doing so, we may not in fact be blaming
the group as a collective. Instead, we may be doing one of two
15

David Cooper, Collective Responsibility, 43 PHIL. 258, 258 (1968).
See generally Deborah Tollefsen, The Rationality of Collective Guilt, 30
MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 222 (2006).
17
Id. at 224–226.
18
Id. at 226–228.
16
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other things: namely, blaming individual members of the group
who are from our perspective representative of it or blaming all
members of the group by virtue of their group membership. Both
possibilities are suggested by Tollefsen’s references to shame and
pride—practices that appear to require moral consciences—as well
as by the fact that when we blame groups we almost always blame
individual members of them.
Cooper himself recognizes the possibility that collective blame
may turn out to be shared individual responsibility, rather than a
kind of responsibility that is attached to collectives themselves, and
sets out to dispute such a possibility.19 He does so by analyzing
statements that we make about collective blame.20 Cooper argues
that when we look at statements about collective blame, we see
that we cannot deduce anything from them about individuals
themselves.21 He claims “[t]his is so because the existence of
collectives is compatible with varying membership. No
determinate set of individuals is necessary for the existence of the
collective.”22
Peter French takes a similar approach in his own defense of
collective responsibility arguing that there is a class of predicates
that can only be true of collectives. There is, of course, a class of
predicates that just cannot be true of individuals, that can only be
true of collectives. Examples are abundant, and surely include
“disbanded” (most uses of), “lost the football game,” “elected a
president,” and “passed an amendment.” Methodological
individualism would be at a loss in responsibility contexts, if
accountability ascriptions were of this sort.23
French is undoubtedly correct with regard to the particular kind
of predicate that he has in mind. The predicate “being to blame,”
however, is of a different kind. For, it does not, like “disbanding,”
“losing a football game,” “electing a president,” and “passing an
amendment,” necessarily involve the efforts of a group. Nor does it

19

Cooper, supra note 15, at 259.
Id. at 260.
21
Id. at 261.
22
Id. at 260.
23
Peter A. French, Types of Collectives, in INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY 37 (Peter A. French, ed. 1998).
20
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require us to refer to a group in order to make sense of what is
being done. Indeed, it may not even be the kind of thing that we
can associate with groups, if groups, as distinct from their
members, turn out not to have a moral conscience.24
All of this suggests that if we are ever going to justify the
possibility of collective moral responsibility and the notion of
moral blameworthiness associated with it, we cannot simply point
out that we blame groups in practice or show that there are kinds of
things (good and bad) that only groups can do, since our blaming
practices might be mistaken and doing something does not get us
to the point of moral responsibility. Instead, we have to show that
groups can be moral agents of harm in the sense required by moral
responsibility as understood above. In other words, we have to
show that groups can have intentions and a moral conscience qua
groups.
Not surprisingly, both tasks are very difficult. In the case of
group intentions, we have to show that groups can have minds,
since intentions are by nature mental states. Moreover, we have to
do so even if we lower our standards and talk about intentions that
are shared among group members, rather than about group
intentions per se. For, intentions, as mental states, can be shared
only by positing a shared mind and a shared mind looks awfully
much like a group mind. In Brook Sadler’s words, “[if] intentions
are mental states, states which play a fundamental role in an
agent’s practical deliberations and volition, the prospect of a
shared intention introduces the specter of shared mental states and
hence shared minds.”25
How, then, can defenders of collective moral responsibility
render the notion of group or even shared intentions
comprehensible? Interestingly enough, defenders of collective
responsibility frequently turn back to the works of Durkheim and
Simmel, as well as to that of Sartre, to ground such intentions,
24

The requirement of moral conscience coincides with that of free will and
moral agency cited above. To wit: In order for individuals to be morally
blameworthy, they must have freely willed their bad actions, and in order to
freely will these actions as bad actions, they must have a moral conscience, i.e.,
be conscious of the rightness and wrongness of their actions.
25
See generally Brook Jenkins Sadler, Shared Intentions and Shared
Responsibility, 30 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 115 (2006).
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although they do so as analytic philosophers rather than as social
theorists.26 Margaret Gilbert, who grounds her defense of
collective responsibility in Durkheim’s theory of social facts,
develops what she calls a “plural subject” account of shared
intentions to justify group intentions.27 She does so in large part,
like Michael Bratman and others do, by zeroing in on joint
commitments.28 According to Gilbert, group intentions exist when
two or more persons constitute the plural subject of an intention to
carry out a particular action, or, in other words, when “they are
jointly committed to intending as a body to do A.”29
All of this makes sense both linguistically and logically, but we
still have to know what it means to say that two or more persons
constitute a plural subject. How, we have to ask, do they constitute
such a subject? What is the nature of the “plural subject” that gets
constituted in this context? (How might we describe it?) David
Velleman takes us part of the way by arguing that “[a] truly plural
subject . . . involve[s] two or more subjects who combine in such a
way as to make one subject . . . .”30 But we still need to know how
they combine to make one subject here and what that subject is. Do
their minds meld? Or do their minds overlap? Do they share
minds? Or do they, as Gilbert suggests, simply share
26

See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (W.
D. Halls trans., 1982); GEORG SIMMEL, ON INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL FORMS
(D.N. Levine trans., 1971); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL
REASON (Alan Sheridan-Smith trans., 1976).
27
Gilbert’s work on plural subjects has developed in very interesting ways
over the years. See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings, 1
J. ETHICS 65 (1997); MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (1989);
MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL
SUBJECT THEORY (2000); Margaret Gilbert, Who’s to Blame?, 30 MIDWEST
STUD. IN PHIL. 94 (2006).
28
Others do not necessarily use the term “joint commitments.” See, e.g.,
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION
AND AGENCY 93160 (1999); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity,
101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS
97 (1993). See also infra notes 3036.
29
GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 27, at 22 (using
the term “shared intentions” rather than “group intentions”).
30
David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 29, 30 (1997).
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commitments?
What, moreover, are the plural subjects that result from such
shared commitments? Neither Gilbert nor Velleman answers this
question, other than to repeat that the subjects in question come
together to make one subject. But we can be sure that if these
plural subjects are going to be considered morally blameworthy by
virtue of having done something bad together, they have to be
moral agents. Likewise, we can be sure that if they are going to be
moral agents they will have to have one mind, rather than
remaining a plurality of minds, and that that one mind will have to
be capable of being the source of moral actions, i.e., the kind of
mind that can formulate intentions.
Gilbert’s emphasis on shared commitments does not appear to
provide us with the kind of unitary mind that we need to sustain
collective moral responsibility. Indeed, as long as the commitments
that Gilbert has in mind are shared, rather than associated with a
single being, her plural subjects remain a plurality of minds rather
than one mind. While positing a plurality of minds may be a good
way to ground shared individual responsibility, it does not allow us
to talk about the moral responsibility of collectives per se. How, if
at all, might we get around this problem?
Raimo Tuomela comes close to doing so in his own work on
collective responsibility by articulating what he calls “weintentions.”31 Tuomela, like Gilbert, constructs the collective
subject on the basis of joint commitments and then applies it to the
notion of collective responsibility.32 However, he does not, like
Gilbert, stress plurality in his construction of the collective subject.
Instead, Tuomela stresses unity and argues for it by claiming that
collective intentional agency supervenes on individual moral
agency in ways that allow us to do two things that Gilbert and
others are not quite able to do: namely, posit genuine collective

31

See, e.g., Raimo Tuomela, Actions By Collectives, 3 PHIL. PERSP. 471
(1989); Raimo Tuomela, Joint Intention, We-Mode, and I-Mode, 30 MIDWEST
STUD. IN PHIL. 35 (2006); Raimo Tuomela, We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group
Intentions, 51 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 249 (1991); Raimo Tuomela,
We-Intentions Revisited, 125 PHIL. STUD. 327 (2005).
32
See Tuomela, We-Intentions Revisited, supra note 31, at 332–40
(discussing joint commitments).
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selves and associate them with minds.33
Not surprisingly, Tuomela’s success here depends on his
ability to describe the process of supervention in a way that leads
us to accept the possibility of a genuine collective moral agent.
What does he mean by supervention in this context? How does
supervention work here? According to Tuomela, actions by
collectives supervene on the actions of the operative members of
the collective in such a way that the properties of particular
collectives, such as their intentions, beliefs, and desires, are
“embodied in” and “determined by” the perspectives of individual
members.34
Tuomela is of course obliged to tell us what it means for a
collective’s intentions, beliefs, and desires to be “embodied in” and
“determined by” the perspectives of individual members here. In
doing so, he must make three things in particular clear. The first is
how collectives can have intentions, beliefs, and desires at the
outset, i.e., before the collective supervenes on the operative
members of the collective. The second is the identity of the
collective subject behind these intentions, beliefs, and desires. The
third is the ability of this subject to be a moral agent that is capable
of being morally blameworthy as a collective entity.
In sum, Tuomela has to be able to conceive of a mind that is
not only attached to a collective but that exists before it supervenes
onto individual minds, since otherwise the mind that he calls
collective is no more than a plurality of individual minds and
hence not sufficient to sustain his claims about “we-intentions.”35
Likewise, he has to make sure that this kind of mind can will
actions on the basis of something like moral choice making, since
otherwise, the “we-intentions” in question will not be the kinds of
“we-intentions” that render an agent morally blameworthy. Can he
do these things?
Suffice it to say that Tuomela’s claim that collective intentions
are partly “determined” by the perspectives of the operative
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members of these collectives does not, as he assumes, allow him to
talk about collective moral agency.36 For, the fact that individual
group members determine a group’s beliefs, intentions, and desires
does not mean that the collective takes on their moral agency in the
process. Nor is moral agency transferable in any case. For, it is not
a thing—the product of willing—or something that we can detach
from moral agents. Instead, it is the act of willing itself and hence
tied exclusively to moral agents and their own mental states.
Moreover, if a collective’s beliefs, intentions, and desires have
to be “determined” by group members, how can the collective
“supervene” on these same group members as a moral agent?
Tuomela is faced with a dilemma here. On the one hand, he needs
the moral agency of group members to make sense of a collective
moral subject. On the other hand, he cannot acknowledge the
collective’s dependence on group members—and “determination”
is surely a kind of dependence—without sacrificing that which
appeared originally to constitute evidence of the collective’s moral
agency, namely, the collective’s ability to “supervene” on others.
Since the problem here is that collectives do not appear to have
minds and hence do not appear to be capable of formulating
intentions, we might want to shift our attention from the act of
intending in this context to something that sounds like intending
but that does not require us to talk about the ability of groups to
freely will actions. I refer here to the intent that we sometimes
locate in a group’s policies or laws. Why bring up intent in this
context? What does it do for us? How, if at all, might we sustain
judgments of collective moral responsibility in cases where to talk
about intent makes sense?
Two things speak to the value of taking intent seriously here.
First of all, the intent of a law or a policy can both have its source
in the minds, as well as beliefs, intentions, and desires, of
individuals and be associated with a group project. Moreover, it
can do so consistently, since that which is collective here is not a
moral act. Instead, it is a thing that it can be abstracted from the
moral agents who created it. Hence, we do not have to associate it
with a collective mind. Nor do we have to be concerned when we
make reference to the individuals who originally articulated it.
36

Tuomela, Actions By Collectives, supra note 31, at 494.
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Indeed, we can make reference to these individuals openly and
consistently.
Is such a shift of focus appropriate here? As Lawrence Solan’s
work on statutory interpretation demonstrates very nicely, a focus
on intent, rather than intentionality, is totally appropriate in
contexts such as those associated with statutory interpretation.37
For, in these contexts, we are not concerned about the process by
which, say, a group of legislators, formulated a law or policy.
Instead, we are concerned with what they had in mind when they
put the law or policy forward, or, in other words, with the product
of many minds, which is a thing, albeit an intellectual thing, rather
than an act of will. Hence, we do not have to locate a single mind
or a single moral conscience.
But things change when we move on to questions of moral
responsibility. For, in the context of moral responsibility, unlike
that of statutory interpretation, we cannot be satisfied with
knowing what a group meant when they passed a particular law or
formulated a particular policy. Instead, we have to know whether
they willed a particular action and are morally blameworthy.
Likewise, in the context of moral responsibility, unlike that of
statutory interpretation, we cannot be satisfied with locating intent.
Instead, we have to locate intentionality, which, I have suggested
above, is a very hard, if not impossible, thing to do.
How, then, are we to proceed? Since we may never be able
make sense of group intentions or locate them in practice, we
might want simply to give up talking about collective moral
responsibility altogether. However, as I elaborate more fully in the
next section, to do so is not necessary and would in any case be
premature. For, the standards of moral agency that we now
associate with moral responsibility, including free will and
intentionality, may not be the standards of moral responsibility per
se. Instead, they may be the standards of one particular notion of
moral responsibility that we do not necessarily have to accept.
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See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427
(2005).
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II. ARE GROUP INTENTIONS REALLY NECESSARY?
Why do we need to talk about group intentions in the first
place? Why do these intentions have to serve the function of free
will in discussions of moral responsibility and why do we have to
talk about free will in the context of moral responsibility anyway?
The answer to these questions lies not, as we often assume, with
the nature of moral responsibility per se. Instead, it lies with the
nature of the particular, Kantian, notion of moral responsibility that
has come to prevail in philosophical circles in recent decades.
Joel Feinberg captures this notion very nicely when he writes:
[A] stubborn feeling persists even after legal responsibility
has been decided that there is still a problem – albeit not a
legal problem – left over: namely, is the defendant really
responsible (as opposed to “responsible in law”) for the
harm? This conception of a “real” theoretical responsibility
as distinct from a practical responsibility relative to the
purposes and values of a particular legal system is
expressed very commonly in the terminology of “morality”
– moral obligation, moral guilt, moral responsibility . . .38
Unlike either social blameworthiness or legal accountability,
moral responsibility is, according to Feinberg, a purely factual
matter and as such not susceptible to discretionary judgment. “Like
all matters of ‘record’, moral responsibility must be read off the
facts or deduced from them; there can be no irreducible element of
discretion for the judge.”39 Likewise, moral responsibility must be
construed as independent not only of any purposes, policies, or
goals that we may embrace, but of our own opinions about whether
or not a particular individual is blameworthy. For, unlike its
worldly counterparts, moral responsibility is:
liability to charges and credits on some ideal record,
liability to credit or blame (in the sense of “blame” that
implies no action). Just as it is, as we say, “forever to the
credit” of a hero or a saint that he performed some noble
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act, so a man can be “forever to blame” for his faults.40
Feinberg and others do not explore the nature of “ideal
liability” in any depth. But they do make clear that it has its source
in individual moral agents themselves. According to Feinberg,
individuals are morally blameworthy, not in virtue of our social
and legal practices of blame, but in virtue of their having
themselves caused (freely willed) either their own actions or an
external state of affairs. Likewise, moral blameworthiness is an
aspect of moral agency itself: “an absolute responsibility within the
power of the agent.”41
Michael Zimmerman, in his own efforts to show how moral
blameworthiness—and hence moral responsibility—can be
independent of worldly practices of blame, focuses on what he
takes to be the inwardness and ideal nature of both. According to
Zimmerman:
Moral responsibility has to do with the type of inward
moral praising and blaming that constitutes making a
private judgment about a person. . . . It is “credit” on his
“ledger of life”, a “positive mark” on his “report card”, or a
“blemish” or “stain” on his “record”; that his record has
been “tarnished”; that his “moral standing” has been
diminished . . . . Someone who is blameworthy is deserving
of such blame; that is, if it is correct, or true to the facts, to
judge that there is a “debit” on his “ledger.”42
Not surprisingly, it is difficult for secular philosophers to make
sense of moral blameworthiness here, since they cannot invoke
either an external blamer (God or the community) or particular
practices of blame. Hence, they do not generally try to make sense
of the “ledger of life,” “moral stains,” and moral “report cards”
that they invoke. Instead, they either place quotation marks around
these terms—signaling the possibility that they are mere metaphors
for something deeper and more easily justified—or else they refer
off-handedly to an omniscient “World Moral Authority” that
presumably has access to ideal standards of moral
40
41
42
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blameworthiness.43
I argue elsewhere that the notion of moral responsibility that
emerges here is essentially the internalization of what was once
expressed openly as the Christian notion of moral blameworthiness
and that it falls apart once we realize two things. The first is that
terms such as “moral stains” on one “ledger of life,” moral “report
cards,” and a “World Moral Authority” cannot be sustained in a
secular context. The second is that without them moral
blameworthiness cannot be viewed as an aspect of moral agency
itself or independent of worldly practices of blame.44
Suffice it here to make three points about this notion of moral
responsibility that relate to our ability to re-think moral
responsibility in a collective context. First of all, this notion of
moral responsibility is not moral responsibility per se. Instead, it is
a distinctly Kantian notion of moral responsibility that, unlike, say,
its Aristotelian, Christian, and utilitarian, counterparts, locates
moral blameworthiness in the wills of moral agents rather than in
social and legal practice, insists that moral blameworthiness be
independent of any goals or purposes that we may have as a
community, and construes moral blameworthiness as a matter of
moral guilt or moral taint.
Second, it is only because we accept this distinctly Kantian
notion of moral responsibility that we insist, not only that an
agent’s actions have been causally responsible for harm, but that
the agent has freely willed or at least intended these actions and
that there be something about the act of freely willing or intending
itself that renders agents morally blameworthy. In other words, it is
only because we accept this notion of moral responsibility that we
find it necessary to impose the conditions of moral responsibility
that we now do on both individuals and collectives.
Third, there are other ways of thinking about moral
responsibility.
Aristotelians
construe
the
notion
of
43

John Harris, for example, falls back on the language of a “World Moral
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the community. According to Harris, “[s]urely the World Moral Authority’s
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blameworthiness associated with moral responsibility as part of our
communal practices of blame rather than as an aspect of moral
agency per se.45 Thus, while they, too, insist that an individual
must have been causally responsible for harm in order to be
morally responsible for it, they do not require that the individual
must have freely willed the harm. Instead, they require only that
the agent be able to meet communal standards of blame, e.g., that
the agent not have been coerced or compelled into acting badly.46
The Christian notion of moral responsibility, like its Kantian
counterpart, takes blameworthiness out of the community and does
something that the Aristotelian notion of moral responsibility does
not: namely, distinguish between moral and social
blameworthiness. But, unlike its Kantian counterpart, it does not
abstract moral blameworthiness from all practices of blame. Nor
does it view an agent as morally blameworthy outside of a
relationship between the agent and an external blamer. Instead, it
views individuals as morally blameworthy within a relationship
between agents and such a blamer—God—who presumably has
access to ideal standards of blameworthiness.47
45

Aristotle developed his theory of moral responsibility in ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. 1 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill
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Utilitarians are in general reluctant to put forward their own,
purely utilitarian, notion of moral responsibility, since thinking
about blame in terms of utility always brings with it the possibility
of draining blame of its power to influence behavior, i.e., its utility.
But they do, in criticizing the Kantian notion of moral
responsibility, make clear that blameworthiness cannot be justified
in a secular context on anything other than utilitarian grounds.
Likewise, they do, in sketching the contours of a utilitarian notion
of moral responsibility, couple causal responsibility with social
blameworthiness and justify such blameworthiness with reference
to its instrumental value.48
All of these notions of moral responsibility have conditions of
their own that collective entities might not be able to meet. Indeed,
since they were all designed to grasp the moral agency of
individuals, rather than that of collective entities, they might not be
any more appropriate to discussions of collective moral
responsibility than their Kantian counterpart. But they do suggest,
at the very least, that we do not have to accept the prevailing
Kantian notion of moral responsibility or its particular conditions
in discussions of moral responsibility and that, if necessary, we can
think about developing an alternative notion moral responsibility
that is appropriate to collective, rather than individual, moral
agents, and that has its own conditions.
III. RE-THINKING COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
What might such an alternative notion of collective moral
responsibility look like? I suggest one possibility below. However,
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at 58–71.
48
The two most frequently cited utilitarian treatments of moral
responsibility are: Richard B. Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHIL.
REV. 337 (1969) and J. J. C. Smart, Free-Will, Praise and Blame, 70 MIND 291
(1961). Brandt argues that guilt feelings and a sense of blameworthiness:
increase motivation in a desired direction—that is, improve the
corresponding kind of character, and suggests that once a sense of
moral blameworthiness comes to be associated with the more general
idea of a particular action, the unpleasant associations provide a
“boost” in the “right direction” for similar situations in the future.
Brandt, supra, at 357.
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since re-thinking moral responsibility in general takes a great deal
of effort, we might want to ask first: Is it worth the effort? Do we
really want to talk about collective moral responsibility anyway?
Do we really need to do so? Two concerns arise here. The first is
the possibility that collective moral responsibility threatens
normative values that we take seriously and hence is not worth
pursuing. The second is that even if collective moral responsibility
is not such a threat, it is unnecessary, since we can accomplish the
same goals in this context by expanding individual moral
responsibility.
The normative value that critics worry about most here is
individual moral responsibility, although concerns about fair
blaming also surface. How, critics ask, can we place collective
moral responsibility at the center of our attention without
undermining the value of individual moral responsibility? How,
moreover, can we ascribe moral responsibility to groups without
rendering individual moral responsibility—and blameworthiness—
insignificant if not meaningless? How, in any case, can we hold
groups collectively responsibility without unfairly blaming some
of its members?
The assumption here is that collective moral responsibility
either undermines individual moral responsibility or shoves it
aside. Garret Hardin argued early on that collective responsibility
undermines individual initiative and creates havoc for those
practices that require individuals to take responsibility for their
own actions, e.g., the maintenance of their own families and
property.49 Contemporary liberals tend to be less vehement than
Hardin was in this context. But, they, too, worry that once
collective responsibility is legitimated, individuals will lose their
sense of individual moral agency, as well as manage to avoid
blame in cases where they should be blamed.50
49

See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI.
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Moreover, the potential loss of individual moral responsibility
here is not a purely personal matter. According to Richard
McKeon, if collective responsibility were to replace personal
responsibility in society, we would no longer be able to sustain
liberal and democratic government, since both liberalism and
democracy require self-government and self-government is only
possible when individuals take responsibility for their actions.
Indeed, McKeon argues, if we were to “revert” to collective
responsibility—McKeon’s argument here is historical—we would
once again find ourselves confronted with the need for a great deal
of state power.51
What about moral responsibility and blameworthiness
themselves? Mark Reiff argues that while collective moral
responsibility can be very helpful in both preventing bad behavior
by groups in the future and bringing about social control more
generally, it can also lead to violence—cycles of retaliation—and
the undermining of morality itself by severing the ties between
responsibility and blame. How is the latter possible? According to
Reiff: “The problem here is not that people are less likely to feel
responsible for their own misconduct if they feel that others will be
held collectively responsible [for harm, but that collective
responsibility] encourages people to feel responsible and subject to
punishment even when they have personally behaved
correctly . . .” and hence, punishment is no longer an incentive.52
In the end, collective responsibility “undermines the very concept
of responsibility itself,” as well as “morality in general,” by
severing the ties between responsibility and a meaningful notion of
blameworthiness and deserved punishment.53
While all of these concerns are important, they appear to
challenge collective moral responsibility only if we are unable to
sustain individual moral responsibility once we legitimate
collective moral responsibility. In other words, they assume that
we cannot have both individual and collective responsibility in the
51
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same community or balance them in a morally acceptable fashion.
But such an assumption may not be warranted and in any case is in
need of empirical verification. Hence, while we may never be able
to balance individual and collective moral responsibility in the way
that we think that they should be balanced, we cannot simply take
it for granted that the two are mutually exclusive.
Why, though, is collective moral responsibility necessary?
Admittedly, there are now cases in which shared individual moral
responsibility would work just fine, e.g., cases in which we can
both locate the particular individuals in a group who caused harm
and conclude honestly that they did so regardless of the group’s
identity or structure. But there are other cases in which we simply
cannot locate the source of harm solely in particular individuals’
actions, shared or otherwise. In these cases, the collective itself
appears to have produced the harm as well—albeit through its
shaping and organization of individual intentions and actions. Here
a purely individualistic model of moral responsibility would not
seem to be the answer.
The classical example here is that of a mob that forms among
individuals whose own intentions may simply be to escape a
natural or man-made disaster but who inadvertently cause harm
together as a mob. In the case of such a mob, there is neither an
organizational structure in place nor a group purpose that we can
locate. Nor are there individuals who can be understood to have
planned the harm or, for that matter, to have acted in a
blameworthy fashion. Hence, we cannot invoke individual moral
responsibility. Instead, we have to acknowledge that it was the
mob itself—which exists above and beyond those participating in
it—that caused the harm.
Mobs provide us with a very straightforward case of collectives
that produce harm by virtue of their nature as particular kinds of
collectives. But mobs are not the only kinds of collectives that
appear to cause harm over and above their individual members.
Indeed, even in cases where we can locate a great deal of bad
behavior on the part of individual moral agents and ascribe moral
responsibility to them for harm, we can still sometimes say that the
collective in question has done something wrong that individuals
themselves could not do and that renders the collective itself
responsible qua collective.
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Three such cases come to mind. The first is that of companies
such as Enron whose ethos and structure were causally responsible
for harm in a way that goes beyond the causal responsibility of
particular members by virtue of the collective nature of these
causal factors. Kenneth Shockley, among others, argues that Enron
as a collective entity played an “eliminable” role in the harm that
its executives brought about by virtue of its company norms,
incentive structures, and practices of discipline. “The norms
operative within the membership of Enron controlled for the
climate of secrecy and doubt.”54
The second case is that of nation states whose military systems
appear to be at least partly responsible for the killing of innocents.
In this case, we may be able locate the particular individuals who
do the killing and, since militaries are organized, we will probably
always be able to go up the chain of command to locate those who
have made various kinds of decisions. (How far up we go is always
a question). But we will also have to confront the fact that there is
something about the structure of the collective that will make the
killing of innocents likely, even if those participating in the war
find the killing of innocents atrocious.
The third case is that of all-male or all-white business clubs
whose very nature promotes the disempowerment of women and
blacks, as well as discrimination against them more generally in
the business world. In this case, we may be able to say that many
of the clubs’ members are morally responsible for the harms in
question. But we have to admit that there is something about the
clubs themselves, including the very bonds that they create among
members and the ideology associated with them, as well as their
admissions policies, which enables club members to do the harm
that they do.
In the above scenarios, a model of collective moral
responsibility would be very helpful. How might we develop such
a model? How might we think about collective moral
responsibility in a way that addresses these cases without violating
individual moral agency or draining blameworthiness of its
meaning? I assume that there are a variety of ways in which we
54
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might proceed here. Let me simply gesture to one possible way of
doing so as a way of opening up discussion about how collective
moral responsibility might be re-conceptualized in the future.
Since we need to associate moral blameworthiness with
agency—otherwise blaming would cease to be either fair or
effective—we will need to retain some kind of causation in our
discussions of collective moral responsibility. Likewise, since we
are talking about collective, rather than individual, moral
responsibility, we will have to make sure that this kind of causation
makes sense in the lives of collectives. In other words, we will,
like Aristotelians, Christian philosophers, and Kantians, have to
work with the particular kinds of moral agents that we have in
mind—in our case collectives, as distinct from citizens of the polis,
Christian souls, or moral idealists—and make sure that we
articulate a notion of causation that is appropriate to them.
What kind of causation might this be? How might we associate
it with blameworthiness in the lives of groups such as corporations,
clubs, and nations states? Here we might want to replace the
Kantian notion of moral agency—as well as the association of
moral responsibility with the act of freely willing a bad action—
with a looser notion of producing or creating harm. In other words,
we might want to associate agency with producing and creating in
our efforts to develop a notion of moral responsibility that makes
sense in the context of groups.
Not surprisingly, not just any kind of producing or creating
will do here. Instead, it has to be producing or creating that
presupposes control by the collective over the harm’s having come
about—even in cases where individual members performed the bad
actions that resulted in harm—by virtue of group structure,
identity, or ideology. In other words, the producing or creating in
question has to be both necessary to the harm’s having come
about—individuals could not have produced or created it on their
own—and a condition under which these individuals were able to
act badly.
Since collectives will in most cases produce harm by enabling
or leading group members to perform harmful actions, collective
moral responsibility will probably always involve the actions of
group members. (How could it not in the context of corporations,
clubs, and nation states, as well as that of mobs?) But this
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likelihood does not require us to equate collective moral
responsibility with individual moral responsibility. For, collectives
can—and should—be understood as doing something that these
individuals could not do without the collective’s support.
Two things change by shifting our attention to producing and
creating in the context of collective moral responsibility. First of
all, we no longer ask: “Did the corporation, club, or nation state in
question willingly cause harm?” (“Were its intentions bad? Did it
act on these intentions?”) Instead, we ask: “Is there something
about the collective entity itself—such as its structure, identity,
ethos, laws, ideology, or code of conduct—that is to be blame for
the harm?” (“Were group members led to act in the way they did
because of one or more of these aspects of the collective?”)
Second, the agent in this context does not have to have freely
willed harm or intended it in the sense required by individual
moral responsibility. Instead, two other things have to be true.
First of all, the group in question must have what Kenneth
Shockley calls “coordinating control” over group members and be
capable of ensuring that its members work together in a particular
way to bring about harm.55 Second, the group must have been
necessary to the harm’s having come about. In other words, group
members could not have brought the harm about on their own.
What kind of collective entities meet these conditions? As
Shockley himself argues very nicely, in Enron, the climate of
dishonesty and the perverted incentive system enabled, if not led,
group members to defraud their shareholders and the public.56
Hence, we can conclude in this case that while particular
individuals carried out the fraudulent actions and may well have
cheated on their own, the harm in question would not have been
possible without the collective’s accounting practices and secretive
administrative structures. In other words, we can conclude that the
corporation was necessary to the harm’s occurrence.
Nation states have many sub-groups and hence many
candidates for collective moral responsibility. In the case of a
military operation gone wrong, we can say that the nation state—or
at least its particular military system—was causally responsible for
55
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harm if, say, the particular command structure in place or the
nature of its weaponry led soldiers to kill non-combatants out of
necessity. Likewise, when looking at the nation state’s economic
system, we can say that it—or at least parts of it, e.g., a lax
regulatory agency—was responsible for various market abuses if
the harm could not have occurred without these agencies’ lax
behavior.
In such a circumstance, what kind of moral blameworthiness
can, and should, we associate with the production or creation of
harm? Two things need to be understood at the outset. First of all,
the kind of moral blameworthiness that we come up with does not
have to be an aspect of collective moral agency itself. Nor does it
have to be independent of social and political practice. Instead, it
can be a judgment that we ourselves make as a community after
the group in question has acted and hence be relative to our own
criteria of blame, as well as to the purposes behind these criteria
and the practices of blame of which they are a part.
Second, just as Aristotelians, Christian philosophers, and
Kantians, if not utilitarians, developed their notion of moral
blameworthiness with reference to particular notions of moral
agency, so can we. In other words, we do not have to conform to a
view of moral blameworthiness that was intended to capture, say, a
Christian or secularized Christian, sense of moral agents. Nor, for
that matter, do we have to conform to a view that was developed to
capture the moral agency of individuals. Instead, we can—and
should—begin by asking: What kind of moral blameworthiness
might be appropriate to groups such as corporations, nation states,
and clubs?
Since groups do not have minds or moral consciences of their
own qua groups, we cannot consider them to be morally guilty in
the internalized sense that we encountered above. Nor,
presumably, would we want to do so—given that they are
organizations rather then persons. (Mobs may fall out of the
picture here since they are not organized.)57 But we can understand
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collectives as doing bad things in the world by virtue of their
particular identity or structure and hence deserving of the kinds of
blame and punishment that we now or should in the future
associate with groups such as corporations, clubs, and nation
states.
What would it mean for such a group to be deserving of
punishment? What might punishment mean in the context of
collectives? In cases where the harm in question is very great and
the group cannot be reformed without denying its core identity or
reason to be, it might mean that the group deserves to be
eliminated altogether as a group (which is in no way to say that its
members should be eliminated as individuals). The Nazi regime
provides us with such a case. So, too, might some contemporary
race-based hate groups in the United States and elsewhere.
In other cases, the kind of blame and punishment that
constitutes the backdrop to blameworthiness might be associated
with reparations for wrongdoing. In these cases, we would have to
say of a group, e.g., a corporation that knowingly wreaked havoc
on the environment and destroyed the livelihood of citizens, that it
deserves to be punished financially and forced to pay reparations to
those who have been harmed. Moreover, if our concern is with
moral blameworthiness, we would have to say that the group is
blameworthy, not simply according to law, but according to the
community’s sense of acceptable and unacceptable moral behavior.
In the case of corporations, we can also think about punishing a
particular company that has done moral harm as a matter of
restricting their autonomy. In some cases, the restriction of
autonomy might be a matter of forcing the corporation to
restructure itself or partly disband in the interests of making sure
that it does not continue to do harm in the future. In other cases, it
might be a matter of political authorities temporarily taking over
parts of the company’s operations while such restructuring is
carried out or while personnel is being shuffled.
Not surprisingly, the particular form that blame takes here is
restricted by what we take to be the legitimate reach of the state. In
cases where the state has no legitimate role, we will not be able to
say that a collective deserves legal punishment. But we still might
be able to say, in cases where to do so is warranted by the facts,
that the collective deserves—in a moral sense—to be condemned
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by the community and perhaps even boycotted. Moreover, we can
and probably should do so even in cases where the state can
intervene, e.g., in cases where clubs violate existing antidiscriminatory law.
Since those writing about collective moral responsibility have
generally assumed that they have to work within the parameters of
the prevailing, Kantian, notion of moral responsibility, they have
not as a group explored many of these possibilities. But there are
important exceptions. Kenneth Shockley, in his work on collective
moral responsibility, replaces the Kantian notion of moral
blameworthiness with a looser notion of “being at fault” that
allows us to talk about a particular collective as “deserving of
some kind of punishment apart from that meted out to its members
for their role in harm.”58
Neta Crawford also distances herself from the Kantian notion
of moral blameworthiness in her work on collective moral
responsibility and talks about groups as doing morally bad
things—in some cases through the actions of their members—
because of the particular kind of group that they are and how they
operate.59 Crawford’s particular concern here is with military
groups whose soldiers end up killing innocent civilians as a result
of either their particular rules of military engagement or the kinds
of weapons that they employ. How, if it all, Crawford asks, can we
talk about both the military and the nation state of which it is a part
as morally blameworthy in these cases?
Crawford responds that while it makes no sense to consider a
military group morally guilty in the sense of having a tainted soul,
it does make sense to consider it a morally bad organization that
deserves punishment.60 Crawford, unlike many others, recognizes
in this context that we have to be careful that the punishment that
groups deserve—and the notion of moral blameworthiness
associated with them—are appropriate to the particular kind of
group they are.61 Hence, she chooses to view punishment, as well
58
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as moral blameworthiness, in the cases about which she is
concerned, as a matter of forcing a collective to apologize, make
amends, and change.62
According to Crawford, the “change” here frequently amounts
to either eradicating parts of the group in question or changing
those aspects of the group that lead it to produce harm. In the case
of, say, a terrorist operation that was developed precisely to bring
about harm, eradication may be appropriate. In the case of a
military group that is otherwise acceptable, it might mean
“reduc[ing] the likelihood of systematic atrocities and avoidable
accidents by reviewing and revising the choice of weapons and
rules of engagement. And . . . apologiz[ing] and mak[ing] repair
when systematic atrocity occurs.”63
How might we incorporate the kinds of blameworthiness that
Shockley and Crawford articulate here into an alternative notion of
collective moral responsibility? I have suggested in this essay that,
before all else, we will have to stop thinking about collective moral
responsibility as a moral fact about agents—that they freely willed
harm and are morally blameworthy by virtue of doing so—and
begin thinking about collective moral responsibility as a matter of
two judgments that we as a moral community make about a group
on the basis of our own standards: namely, that the group did
something morally wrong by producing harm and that the group is
worthy of a particular kind of (worldly) blame.
Not surprisingly, the view of collective moral responsibility
that I have put forward here is bound to appear unsatisfactory to
Kantians, since the two judgments on which it rests are both
relative to our own norms, expectations, and projects. But, I have
suggested above, the fact that we have the power to shape our
judgments of casual responsibility and moral blameworthiness as a
community should not be taken as a threat to either individual or
collective moral responsibility. Instead, it should be taken as the
basis for developing notions of both that are coherent and
appropriate to the particular kinds of moral agents with which they
are associated, as well as useful to us in grounding more worldly
Id. at 196–206.
62
Id. at 212.
63
Id.
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practices of social blame and legal punishment.

